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STUDIES IN ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE.*
II. THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY.
I.
In no province does the familiar constitutional doctrine of
the separation of powers break down more completely than in
the special field of the law of civil procedure occupied by what
we know as the rules of practice. The substantive law of the
State may lay down with the greatest precision the rights of an
individual, and how far their infringement will be repaired by
legal remedy, but to the person wronged the question of how and
when he can obtain his remedy is equally important. Suitors are
not satisfied with syllogisms; they are more interested in the re-
sults. It is therefore necessary to provide a safe means by which
the litigant can, with proper expedition and directness, pass
through contention and attain satisfaction. Upon what depart-
ment of the State should that duty be placed? Is the function of
prescribing rules of procedure executive, judicial or legislative?
In so far as it pertains to the carrying out and practical enforce-
ment of substantive law, it is an executive duty; in so far as it
aids judges to arrive at the true issues in controversy, it is judi-
cial; and in so far as it has a binding effect upon the conduct of
*Part One of this article, "The Atmosphere," appeared in the December
issue, 63 UNIW.Rsrry oF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW. 1O.
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the parties, it is of legislative nature. Undoubtedly it partakes
of all three of the attributes enumerated. It appears, therefore,
that no one of the three branches of our government is, by the
theory of the constitution or the character of the duty, so peculi-
arly fitted for this work that the other two must be excluded from
consideration. In such a position, the guiding principle becomes
one of expediency. Now expediency is a matter on which there
may be argument, and different conclusions may be arrived at'by
different minds, though faced with the same problems and seek-
ing the same ends.
It is by some such process of reasoning that the impartial
observer must explain to himself why it is that the great nations
on opposite sides of the Atlantic who rule themselves by legal
principles developed out of a common law have come to such dif-
ferent conclusions as to the method of defining the practice by
which those principles are applied to specific disputes. Although
practically all of the United States are committed to the plan of
issuing practice rules from their State capitols by way of legisla-
tive fiat, the people of England place in the hands of their judges
the power to mould and alter the practice of the courti. In Penn-
sylvania, as in her sister States, suitors and courts alike are ruled
in their conduct by an iron hand that reaches out from the statute
books ;' in England the rules of procedure are not master but ser-
vant to the courts, ever studying and conforming to the progress
of the times.
2
The motives behind these strikingly different conclusions
are, in some measure, capable of historical explanation. The
courts of Pennsylvania were, from their very beginning, tribunals
not of a superior power, but of the people themselves, set up not
to serve as channels for the outpouring of royal grace and favor,
but to provide for a mutual settlement of disputes among the
Observe, for instance, the mandatory refinements of the Execution Act
of 18.36. P. L 755, or of the Service Act of igoz, P. L 614, as samples of
rigid enactments.
'Lord Collins, M. R., said, in Re Coles and Ravenshear [igo7], i K. B.
1. 4: "Their relation to the work of justice is intended to be that of hand-
maid rather than mistress, and the Court ought not to be so far bound and
tied by rules which are, after all, only intended as general rules of pro-
cedure. as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice in the particular
cause. '
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inhabitants. 3 Indeed, legal proceedings in early Pennsylvania
were more in the nature of arbitration than of lawsuits, for "be-
fore the Revolution the Bench was rarely graced by professional
characters."'4 The Council of the Colony, in its capacity of rep-
resentative of the people, deciding on all matters affecting the
public weal, naturally undertook the task of shaping the power
and procedure of the courts it created. Thus began the custom
which is still observed today. An omniscient legislature still un-
dertakes to solve all problems that trouble the good people of
Pennsylvania, and in, occasional moments of respite from the
tasks of social reform, it hammers out, by way of change, a rule
or two for the courts.
The English courts, on the other hand, were not the people's
but the king's. The Crown, in the English constitution, is the
fountainhead of justice. However much of a fiction the partici-
pation of the king in public affairs may be today, he-was, in the
early days, in a very real sense, the dispenser of right. It was
to him, personally, or to his Chancellor, that pleas were addressed
and it was by him or by his deputies that judgments were ren-
dered. Until the signing of Magna Charta, his. court even tol-
lowed him when he departed from Westminster. Obviously, the
methods and proceedings of the kink's justices were not, in the be-
ginning, matter for supervision by the Parliament. First by de-
cisions and directions given in particular cases, and later by rules
and orders formulated for general use, 5 the judges of each- of the
superior courts gradually built up a procedure suited to the char-
acter of the issues that came before them for trial." So well rec-
*Lawrence Lewis, Jr., in a paper on "The Constitution, Jurisprudence
and Practice of the Courts of Pennsylvania in the Seventeenth Century,"
read before the Historical Society of Pennsylvania March 4, 1881, published
in Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 5, p. 141, and
reprinted in Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, I895, vol. i,
p. 353.
' From an address delivered in Philadelphia in 1826 by William Rawle,
Sr., quoted in Bar Association Report (op. cit.), p. 6.
2 The courts have at common law jurisdiction to make general rules for
the regulation of the practice before them. Bartholomew v. Carter, 3 Man-
ning & Granger, 125 (1841).
"TechnicaUly on the same legal footing as the modern Statutory Orders
in Council, but in fact, and historically, inclining somewhat heavily towards
judicial legislation, are the various Rules and Orders affecting the practice of
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ognized was this form of authority when Parliament set out upon
its career as law reformer about the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury,7 that, rather than upset a useful and established custom, it
clothed the custom with its sanction and elevated it to the dig-
nity of statute law.8 Such, briefly, is the historical background
of the present Rule Committee as constituted under the Judi-
cature Acts.
Apart from these interesting historical speculations, the
mere fact that there exist two such divergent streams leading
from a common source is in itself sufficient excuse for exploring
the courses of both. To this incentive must be added the inter-
est which the best Pennsylvania lawyers are begirning to take in
the importance of logical modifications in our system of civil
procedure.9 The present article will attempt to describe the rule-
the courts, which have from time to time been published. These go back
for a long period in English legal history; and it is impossible, without
further research into the archives of the fourteenth century, to state defi-
nitely when they began." Edward Jenks: A Short History of English Law
(London, 1912), p. 190.
'Under pressure of the popular agitation worked up by the novels
of Dickens (see E. S. Roscoe: The Growth of English Law, London, 1912,
p. 199) and the propaganda of Bentham (see A. V. Dicey: Law and Public
Opinion, London, i9o5, p. 2o8).
'"A beginning was made with the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (3 & 4
Will. IV, c. 42, s. 3), which authorized any eight of the Common Law
judges (including the three Chiefs) to make rules for the reform of plead-
ing; and the step, having been found beneficial, was repeated, with wider
reach, in the year i8so (13 & 14 Vict., c. 16). These two statutes, which were
temporary in their effect, were incorporated, with many additional powers,
into the Common Law Procedure Acts of 1852 and x854 (Act of x85A §23-
225; Act of i854, §§97-98). Meanwhile, in the year x85o, a similar provision;
with a limited scope, had been introduced into the Chancery Amendment Act
of that year (13 & 14 Vict., c. 35, §§30-32); empowering the Chancellor, with
the concurrence of the Master of the Rolls and one of the Vice-Chancellors,
to make General Rules and Orders for carrying out the objects of the Act.
In the Chancery Amendment Act of 1858, this power was extended to cover
virtually the whole procedure of the Court (21 & 22 Vict., C. 27, §§11-12);
the Rule-making body being enlarged to include the newly created Lords
Justices of Appeal in Chancery. Under this power the great Consolidated
Orders of i86o were issued, and thus the way made easier for the reform
undertaken by the Judicature Act of 1873." Jenks (op. cit.), p. igr. Under
the Act of 1833 the judges issued the Hilary Rules of 1834; the Rules issued
under the Acts of V352 and 1854 may be found in Day: Common Law Pro-
cedure Acts (4th ed., London, 1872), p. 413 et seq. There also appear Rules
made under the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855 (18 &
ig Vict.-, 'c. 67), the Judges' Chambers (Despatch of Business) Act, 1867
(30 & 31 Vict., c. 68), and the Debtors' Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict, c. 62).
For instance, "Canadian Sidelights on Prospective Changes in Pennsyl-
vania Procedure, by David Werner Amram, in 62 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL-
VAr1A LAW REVIEW, 269 (1914). For opinions outside the State, see "Courts
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making power now exercised by the English Bench and the use
that has been made of it since it was bestowed in i875.1° If we
are to decide, on grounds of expediency, where best to put the
rtile-making power in Pennsylvania, the English experience
must be deemed admissible evidence, and its weight can be de-
termined by those who have to pass upon it.
IL
It is necessary, in the first place, to understand the general
organization of the court set up by the Judicature Acts. Amer-
ican students of law are apt to think of those Acts as being a sort
of political upheaval which accomplished, with one stroke, the
complete fusion of law and equity. In fact they were, in one
way, much less than that, and in another, much more.21  Long
before 1875, the three superior courts of common law at West-
minster' 2 had been authorized by statute to take cognizance of
certain equitable rights and to administer certain equitable rem-
edies. Under the Common Law Procedure Acts, the law of the
common law courts correspond closely to Wqhat we have at the
present day in Pennsylvania, where, for historical reasons and
with little statutory assistance, the courts administer a great deal
of equity through the forms of common law.1 s The Court of
for Smaller Cities," published by the American Judicature Society (Chicago,
1914), and the Report of the New York Board of Statutory Consolidation
(Albany, 1912), p. 9.
The original Judicature Act was introduced by Lord Chancellor Sel-
borne and passed in 1873, to take effect in November, 1874. But in 1814 a
change in administration occurred; the new Government deferred the opera-
tion of the Act until November, 1875, when, together with certain changes
and improvements introduced by Lord Cairns, the new Lord Chancellor, it
finally came into operation. It is not often that political opponents collaborate
so generously, even in law reform.
U"The main object of the Judicature Act was to assimilate the trans-
action of equity business and common law business by different courts of
judicature. It has been sometimes inaccurately called 'the fusion of law
and equity'; but it was not any fusion or anything of the kind; it was the
vesting in one tribunal the adiministration of law and equity in every cause,
action or dispute which should come before that tribunal." Sir George
Jessel, M. R., in Salt v. Cooper, 16 Ch. Div. 544, 549 (i88o).
Before the completion of the new Royal Courts of Justice, at Temple
Bar, in the Strand, in 1882, the Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and
Exchequer sat at Westminster, and the Court of Chancery sat at Lincoln's
Inn.
".Troubat & Haley (6th ed., Phila., 1913), voL 1, c. 2.
lSS
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Chancery, too, had been commanded, by the provisions of the
Chancery Amendment Acts, to recognize certain rights and
forms that had previously been considered legal, as opposed to
equitable. There were, therefore, even before the Judicature
Acts, equitable powers in the common law courts and legal pow-
ers in the Court of Chancery.1 4 The Judicature Acts were a final
step which removed the remaining distinction between the two,
in point of jurisdiction," and infused the spirit of equity into the
whole administration of justice." This was but the logical con-
summation of a development that had been in progress for nearly
half a century.
But the great triumph of the Acts was in the revolution
they brought about in the organization of the courts and in
their methods of procedure. True, they left the nominal forms
of separate courts still standing.1 7  But these courts, instead of
"The general effect of these Acts is described as follows, by the Royal
Commission of 1867, whose Reports were the basis for the Judicature Act
of 1873 (in the Report of March, 1869): "By virtue of these Acts the
Court of Chancery is now. not only empowered, but bound to decide for
itself all questions of Common Law without having recourse, as formerly,
to the aid of a Common Law Court, whether such questions arise inci-
dentally in the course of a suit, or constitute the foundation of a suit, in
which a more effectual remedy is sought for the violation of a Common
.Law right, or a better protectioii against its violation than can be had at
Common Law. The Court is further empowered to take evidence orally in
open Court, and in certain cases to award damages for breaches of contract
or wrongs as at Common Law; and trial by jury,-the great distinctive
feature of the Common Law,-has recently, for the first time, been intro-
duced into the Court of Chancery.
"On the other hand, the Courts of Common Law are now authorized
to compel discovery in all cases, in which a Court of Equity would have
enforced it in a suit instituted for the purpose. A limited power has been
conferred on Courts of Common Law to grant injunctions, and to allow
equitable defences to be pleaded, and in certain cases to grant relief from
forfeitures."
15 §24 of the Act of 1873 (36 & 37 Vict., c. 66) is the keynote of this
part of the Acts.
" §25 of the Act of 1873 concludes (subsec. i) : "Generally in all mat-
ters not hereinbefore mentioned, in which there is any conflict or variance
between the Rules of equity and the Rules of the common law with refer-
ence to the same matter, the Rules of equity shall prevail." This section
has been held to apply not to substantive rights but to practice.
"Under the Act of 1873. the High Court consisted of five Divisions:
Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Probate, Divorce
and Admiralty. But after the death of Lord Chief Baron Kelly on Sep-
tember 17, i88o, and of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn on November 2o, 188o0,
the Exchequer, Queen's Bench and Common Pleas Divisions were reduced
and consolidated into one Division, the Queen's (now King's) Bench, by an
Order in Council of December 16, iSo, which came into force February
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being walled off from each other as before, now sit, as it were,
merely in different corners of one great hall. They are all divi-
sions of one Supreme Court, with equal powers and jurisdictions.
Although in effect the business is divided into two main depart-
ments,"' the chancery and the common law, 9 the forms of ac-
26, i88x (Statutory Rules and Orders, 1903, vol. 12, p. r). The Supreme
Court is therefore now constituted as follows: the High Court, in'three
Divisions, and the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal consists of the
Master of the Rolls and five Lords Justices of Appeal (although it can be
enlarged if occasion demands, as the Lord Chancellor, all ex-Lord Chan-
cellors, the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Probate Divorce
and Admiralty Division are members ex officio; see also note 25, infra).
The High Court contains the Chancery Division, consisting of the Lord
Chancellor (who, in fact, never sits) and six justices; the King's Bench
Division, presided over in fact as well as in name by the Lord Chief Justice,
containing eighteen justices; and the Probate Divorce and Admiralty Divi-
sion, where there are only two justices, one of them the President of the
Division. What time the Lord Chancellor can devote to judicial work is
divided between the House of Lords (which hears appeals from the three
Supreme Courts of the United Kingdom) and the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council (which hears appeals from the Supreme Courts of all the
British dependencies).
0 Apart from the varied work done by the Probate Divorce and Admir-
alty Division, which is naturally small in comparison with the other two
Divisions.
3, §34 of the Act of 1873 made a general catalogue, subject to Rules of
Court, of the causes to be assigned to each Division of the High Court.
Under it all actions in their nature equitable are assigned to the Chancery
Division. But it is left to the discretion of the judge, guided by the balance
of convenience, whether he will retain or transfer a cause assigned contrary
to the provisions of the section. Bradford v. Young, 26 Chanc. Div. 656
(1884). In Gibson and Weldon; Practice of the Courts (London, 19r2),
the matter is put thus (pp. io-i): "Though, if a plaintiff bring an action,
say for specific performance of a contract to sell real estate, he is bound to
commenlce it in the Chancery Division, yet this does not rob the King's
Bench Division of its power, as a part of the High Court . . . to decree
specific performance. Thus, suppose A brings an action against B for mis-
representation. The Division to which he would assign his action would
be the King's Bench Divisior. But B might set up as a counterclaim against
A, a claim to have a contract to sell land specifically enforced; and, in spite
of this counterclaim coming within the class of subjects specifically assigned
to the Chancery Division, the King's Bench would have just as much power
to decree specific performance as the Chancery Division. Another example
is afforded by Pinney v. Hunt, 6 Chane. Div. 98 (1877), in which it was laid
down that the Chancery Division has full power to grant probate of a will
in an action for partition, Jessel, IL R., saying, 'It is clear that all the
judges of the High Court have the same jurisdiction, and any judge may,
if he choose, retain the action and exercise the jurisdiction.' . . . Subject
to cases which seem to show that cne division may, but will not lightly,
encroach o1. the exclusive jurisdiction of another, it may be taken as certain
that the assignment of special business to each division does not give wholly
exclusive jurisdiction in that business to that particular division, but amounts
to a mere direction that, as a matter of convenience and to facilitate expt ;-
tion, an action involving a special cause of action must be assigned to its
appropriate division."
158 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tion are alike in each, and a litigant is not embarrassed by the
choice.
20
It is clear, therefore, that justice is now administered in
England not by courts but by judges. The old fictions and tradi-
tions of the rival courts of law and equity have been swept
away, 2-anid in their place t.. sound discretion ot the judiciary
has been left free to declar the rights and settle all controver-
sies between parties in a siflg1e proceeding.22 To match the.9 ,To h new
powers over substantive law bestowed uipon the judges, they
have been given the wilest possible latitude as to the arrange-
ments they consider best for disposing of and distributing ac-
tions among themselves, and, equally important, for the regula-
tion of the procedure which those actions must f611ow frofh be-
ginning to end.
""In the case of In re Besant, Ix Chanc. Div. '5o8 (879), Sir George
Jessel tried an action in which the claim was for an injunction to restrain a
lady from breaking a covenant in a deed of separation between herself and
her husband, and the lady counterclaimed for a. judicial separation. . . .
In practice, the matter rests with the judge before whom the matter is
brought. If he thinks that it would be better tried by a judge of another
division, he forces the parties to assign it tb that division." R. Storry Deans:
Students' Legal History (3rd ed., London, 1913), p. 155. Thus the parties
are spared delay and the utmost penalty is the costs of transfer.
"'The ordinary civil jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench rested
upon the absurd fiction. that the defendant in an action, e. g. for a debt, had
been guilty of a trespass. The ordinary civil jurisdiction of the Court of
Exchequer rested upon the equally absurd fiction that the plaintiff in an
action was a debtor to the king, and, owing to the injury or damage done
him by the defendant, was unable to pay his debt to the king. . . . These
long labyrinths of judge-made fictions seem to a lawyer of today as strange
as the most fanciful dreams of 'Alice in Wonderland,'' Dicey (op. cit.), p. 91.
' §24 (7) of the Judicature Act, 1873, provides that in every action the
court shall grant "all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto
may appear to be entitled to in respect of any and every legal or equitable
claim properly brought forward by them in such cause or matter; so that,
so far as possible, all matters so in controversy between the said parties
respectively may be completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity
of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters avoided," It is very
frequent for plaintiffs to ask both legal and equitable relief in the same
writ; for instance, to ask for an injunction together with damages for tres-
pass, or for an account together with damages for breach of contract, or, in
the alternative, for specific performance, etc.
"Under §§29 and 37 of the Judicature Act, 1873, the Lord Chancellor
is empowered to appoint Commissioners of Assize, who may hear causes on
circuit and have all the powers of judges. This is done when, either through
illness or the need for judges in London, there are'not enough judqes avail-
able in the King's Bench to cover all the circuits. See note 29, infra.
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Short of appointing additional judges (and even that can
be done, in time of emergency23) the Lord Chancellor and his
colleagues on the bench have complete control over the organiza-
tion of the Supreme Court,24 the size of its divisions, 25 the
length of its sittings and vacations,28 the assignment and trans-
fer of judges to or from one division or another,2 7 the arrange-
ments for the work done in London, in district registries28 and
" Under §32 of the Judicature Act, 1873, the number of divisions of the
High Court may be increased or decreased, upon the recommendation of the
Council of Judges to the Privy Council. See notes 31 and 32, infra. It was
under this section that the Order in Council which consolidated the Queen's
Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer Divisions was made in i88o. See
note 17, supra.
"Under §32 of the Judicature Act, 1873, the number of judges perma-
nently attached to any division may be increased or decreased by Order in
Council. Divisional Courts, which have taken the place of the old Court in
Banc, are to be regularly, composed of two judges, under §ix of the Appel-
late Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict., c. 5o), but under §4 of the
Judicature Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict., c. 6), there may be more than two
judges if, at any time, considered expedient by the President of the Division
and two other of its members. The Lord Chief Justice may order more
than one Divisional Court to sit, if business in the King's Bench so requires,
and a majority of the judges in the Division so agree, under §41 of the
Judicature Act, x873. Under §6 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, i9o8
(8 Edw. VII, c. 5i), the Lord Chancellor may build up additional courts,
of three members each, in the Court of Appeal, by requesting judges of the
High Court to sit, temporarily, in the Court of Appeal. Similarly, under
§5i of the Judicature Act, 1873, he may call upon any permanent member
.f the Court of Appeal to sit as an additional judge in any Division of the
High Court. Or, by transfer of judges temporarily from one Division, the
size of another can be increased if necessary; see note 27, infra. Finally,
under §37 of the Judicature Act, 1873, it is left to the judges of the King's
Bench Division to make arrangements among themselves for the sittings tor
trials by jury, so that the greatest number of courts may be sitting at all
times.
m §26 of the Judicature Act, 1873, abolishes terms of court, and provides
for the distribution of sittings according to Rules of Court; see note 5& infra.
§27 provides that orders regulating the vacations may be made, revoked or
modified by Order in Council upun recommendation of the judges. Under
this section two changes have been made in the Long Vacation (which now
runs from August i to October ii), one on December 12, 1883 (Statutory
Rules and Orders, 19o3, vol. 12, p. 7), and another on March x, i97 (W. N.,
Mar. i6, I907, p. 79).
I Besides the temporary transfer from the High Court to the Court of
Appeal and vice versa (see note 25, Supra), the Lord Chancellor may trans-
fer or assign any judge from one Division of the High Court to another,
either because of the illness of a judge, or to sit as an additional judge, with
the concurrence of the President of the latter Division. This transfer may
be either tenlporary, under §5 of the Judicature Act, t884, or permanent,
under §3I of the Judicature Act, 1873.
"As the High Court is a court of original jurisdiction over all of
England and Wales, the Judicature Acts have provided a system of provincial
offices of the Court in places more or less remote from London, where all
the steps in an action from summons to execution, with the exception of the
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on circuit,2' and tle disposition to be made of funds in court."
Sometimes this power is exercised through the form of a council
of all the judgesi 1 sometimes through a resolution of the King's
Privy Council in the form of a siatutory Order of Council,3 - and
frequently by the Lord Chancellor or the Lord Chief Justice,
actual trial, may be taken. Each of these District Registries is in charge of
a Registrar, who -exercises most of the powers of a judge in chambers with
relation to interlocutory applications. Under §6o of the Judicature Act, 1873,
the number and position of these Registries may be prescribed by Order in
Council. and proceedings therein regulated by Rules of Court. Under the
Order in Council of May i9, 1899 (Statutory Rules and Orders, 1903, vol.
12, p. 932), and three subsequent Orders, eighty-nine of these Registries
have been created, their Districts usually coinciding with the County Courts
(whose jurisdiction is limited in amount, to ixoo).
' At certain times of the year, the judges of the King's Bench Division
visit a number of towns all over England and Vales. to hold trials of actions.
The country is divided into bight Circuits, and sittings (assizes) are held in
fifty-six different places two or three times a year (four times in Liverpool,
Manchester and Leeds). There is always about a half of the King's Bench
judges travelling the circuits. As venue has been abolished, the place of
trial of an action (irrespective of whether the action is. going on at the
Central Office in London, or in a District Registry) is made to suit the con-
venience of the parties, and is always" fixed, if not in London, at the assize
town where it will be cheapest: to ,collect all the parties and witnesses.
Under §23 of the Judicature Act; 1875 (38 & 39 Vict., c. 77), the arrange-
ments for circuits and assizes, as to places and times, are made by Order of
Council. No less than fourteen Orders are now in force under this power,
the effort being to do away with assizes where the Niolume of business does
not warrant the expense. More than half of all the civil actions tried on
circuit are tried in Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham and Leeds; only
about four hundred trials a year are held in all the other fifty-two assize
towns together. There is a strong feeling that the circuit system is too
costly, for the results it shows.
"Under §24 of the Judicature Act, 1875 the Lord Chancellor, with the
concurrence of the Treasury (who are presumably more expert in purely
financial matters) may make Rules for the disposition of funds in court.
At the present time, tne Supreme Court Funds Rules, ipos. are in force,
under the Chancery Funds Act, 1872 (35-&36 Vict., c. 44), the Judicature
Act, 1875, the Judicature Funds Act, x883 (46 & 47 Vict, c. 29), and the
Judicature Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict., c. 16).
"Orders in Council affecting the length of vacations or the number of
Divisions or of judges in them can be made only upon the "report or recom-
mendation of the Council of Judges of the Supreme Court." By §17 of the
Judicature Act, 1875, this Council can be made up of five of the Presidents
of the Divisions and Lords of Appeal, together with a majority of the puisne
judges in the three Divisions of the High Court. There- is another Council,
consisting of all the judges, constituted by §75 of the Judicature Act, 1873,
whose duty it is to meet annually and discuss the working of the Act and of
the Rules, but it has held only three meetings since 1875. In practice, such
discussion goes on informally among the judges all the time, so the formal
meeting has been dispensed with.
'These have no counterpart in the American scheme of government
Parliament passes many Acts which create new duties for the administrative
departments to perform; such Acts frequently contain a provision that
leaves the lesser details to be settled and promulgated by Orders in Council,
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either alone33 or with the concurrence of other Government de-
partments or other members of the judiciary.3' When the
cause list is in such a state, in any division, that actions are too
long delayed, additional judges are transferred to the division
from another which is not so far behind.3 5 Within a division it-
self, judges can be assigned to handle specific kinds of cases, who
are more expert than their colleagues in particular fields.36 Trials
such Orders to be read as part of the Act. This allows of changes in
administrative detail to meet conditions as they arise, without either violating
the broad directions of the statute or throwing the burden on an already
overworked legislature. "The Privy Council never meets as a whole now,
except for ceremonial purposes. . . . The adoption of Orders in Council
is a formal matter, requiring the presence of only three persons, who follow
the directions of a minister, for all cabinet ministers are members of the
Privy Council." (Lowell: The Government of England, New York, r9o8,
vol. T, p. 79.) Thus the head of the department affected has a fairly free
hand in setting new policies of the legislature into practical operation. See
notes 24 to 29, supra, for the functions of the Privy Council under the
Judicature Acts.
In practice, nearly all administrative details are settled by the Lord
Chancellur or the Lord Chief Justice, acting alone. Sometimes a merely
formal concurrence is required from the head of another Division. See
notes 27 and 30. supra, and j4, infra. Under §83 of the Judicature Act.
1873, the Lord Chancellor (with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice)
may determine the number, qualifications and tenure of official referees.
There are now three of these, to whom, in rotation, are referred all issues
of fact, which involve complicated accounts or lengthy inspection of docu-
ments. They have all the powers of a judge. The Lord Chancellor may,
at any time, call an extraordinary council of all the judges, under §75 of the
Judicature Act, 1873 (see note 31, supra), but very seldom does. Under §iS
of the Judicature Act, 1879, he may, with the concurrence of the Treasury,
determine the amounts of the salaries of all officers of the Supreme Court.
Frequently he is, with the concurrence of other Government officers, em-
powered by specific statutes to make rules for their legal operation; see
Part IV, infra.
"'As to arrangements for jury trials, see note 38, infra. As to Divi-
sional Courts, see note 25, £u pra. At the request of the President of the
Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division, probate causes may be heard by a
judge of the Chancery Division (with the consent of the Lord Chancellor),
or of the King's Bench Division (with the consent of the Lord Chief Jus-
tice). §44 of the Judicature Act, 1873.
1 See notes 25 and 27, supra. As to probate causes, see note 34, supra.
A similar power in Pennsylvania would enable the courts of the large cities
to bring their dockets into such shape, without extra expense, that actions
could be tried within a fortnight after issue is joined.
"In the King's Bench Division, one of the judges is assigned to hear
all bankruptcy causes; another sits in all trials before the Railway and
Canal Commission Court, whose jurisdiction is under special statutes which
provide that railway and canal companies shall afford reasonable facilities
to all, without undue preference; two judges are told off to hear all disputes
over elections to Parliament; and ove judge is selected before whom are
tried all causes in a special list called the" Commercial List, which includes
actions on policies of insurance, contracts for carriage by sea, and all similar
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are not held up because of the illness or absence of a judge, as
his place can be taken by another judge or by a commissioner
delegated thereto.37  Jury trials and non-jury trials may be be-
gun or continued or discontinued at any part of the sittings, in
accordance with the state of the lists and the number of judges
available for the work.33 Causes may be transferred from one
judge's list to another, even after they have been reached for
trial, and they may be set down for trial on specific days or in
specific places in the list, if occasion demands, instead of going
down to the foot of the list.39 The place of trial may be made
either London or some town in the country, according as the con-
venience of the majority of the witnesses demands.40  In short,
all things may be done which will make it physically possible for
the court to get on quickly with its work; the individual members
are not immovable pillars of the Temple of Justice, but go hither
and thither at the command of the High Priest, giving ear to the
petition of all the faithful.
matters. In the Chancery Division, the winding-up of companies (voluntary
or involuntary dissolution of business corporations) is regulated by Part IV
of the Companies Consolidation Act, x9o8 (8 Edw. VII, c. 69); two judges
are assigned to do the judicial work under the statute. Finally, all issues
in which lengthy accounts must be taken, or documents inspected, .or scien-
tific matters investigated, come before official or special referees or arbi-
trators, so that the judges are not delayed by them at all.
"See notes 23, 27 and 34, jnfta.
§3o of the Judicature Act, 1873, provides that jury trials shall be held
continuously throughout the year by as many judges as the business to be
disposed of may render necessary, and §37 of the same Act makes the sit-
tings for trial by jury subject to arrangements by mutual agreement between
the judges. The actual cause lists are made up in the Central Office, under
directions contained in the Judges' Regulations of September, i888, the
Judges' Resolutions of May and general orders from the Lord Chief Justice,
1894, and published each day.
"Clauses 8, 9, io and ii of the judges' Resolutions of May, i894, allow
the judge to order, "on special grounds," that causes though postponed
should keep their place in the list, that any cause in any list may be marked
urgent or fixed for a day certain, and that a cause may be interpolated in
the week's list even after the list has been made up and sent to the printer.
Section 6 of the Judicature Act, 1884, allows a judge to whom a cause has
been assigned to get another judge in his own division to bear it, for special
reason, although an objecting party can force him to get the Lord Chancel-
lor's consent. The Judges' Resolutions are, of course, liberally interpreted by
the judges themselves.
' See note 29, supra. Official and special references are also allowed by
the Lord Chancellor to try issues and hear evidence in the country if neces-
sary, though there is no express provision for this in the Acts.
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This system, simple and elastic, leaves entirely to the dis-
cretion of the Bench itself the organization and arrangement of
its work, free of legislative interference. 41  In the present state
of public opinion in America, the first comment that rises to the
lips of the reader is: "This is too lax. There is too great op-
portunity for favoritism and abuse." But the conditions sur-
rounding.the English law courts are the best safeguards against
that. The English newspapers give to the doings of the courts
a far greater share of space than do the American dailies. 42 The
judges of the Supreme Court are few in number,43 and there-
fore more subject to scrutiny and criticism. There are espec-
ially active and independent journals in London, 44 in whose edi-
torial columns the administrative policy of the judges is con-
stantly discussed and commented upon. The mutual reliance
between the Bench and Bar is too strong to admit of misuse of
power. These considerations are wholly apart from the princi-
pal and obvious one that the occupants of judicial office are, in
England, usually the best type of men at the Bar, drawn from
the small circle of King's Counsel who have won their way to the
front rank.4' It must also be remembered that we have in none
As Lowell remarks (op. cit., vol. 2, p. 458), "a most elastic and intelli-
gent method of regulating judicial procedure." After one term, it was said
in the Times (November 29, z875) : "Its operation has tended to economize
judicial power and to prevent delay of justice."
"The law reports in the daily Times are so complete that they are often
cited in briefs and text-books, on points untouched by the more official
reports. All the penny newspapers devote several columns each day to
special law reports, which are usually written for them by barristers. Inter-
esting law cases figure almost as largely in the headlines as popular sports,
while the courts are sitting.
"There are only twenty-six who sit as judges of first instance, although
their jurisdiction includes a population of nearly forty million people-the
whole of England and Wales. There are, it is true, fifty-nine county court
judges, but their jurisdiction is limited to isoo.
"THE LAw JouRNAL, LAW Tisss, SOLICITOR'S JouRNAL, and JusTicE or
THE PEAcE, are published weekly. THE LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW and the
LAW MAGAZINE AND RmEw are more learned periodicals, which appear
quarterly.
" The Law List for 19T3 discloses the names of two hundred seventy-
eight- King's Counsel; it is estimated there are nearly ten thousand barristers
living. Of late years, from ten to fifteen King's Counsel have been created
annually. There is some risk involved in accepting the honor, as the etiquette
of the Bar forbids a King's Counsel to accept a brief unless there is a
junior briefed along with him. It is not infrequent that a barrister who has
made a success as a junior does not inspire the kind of confidence necessary
for larger cases, and he may find himself stranded without business after he
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of the American States an officer who corresponds to the Eng-
lish Lord Chancellor. His powers are far greater than those of
the Chief Justice in a State system of judicature. He is, besides
being the head of the English judiciary, a member of the
Cabinet, a member of the Privy Council, and presiding officer of
the House of Lords. His functions are today even more polit-
ical than they are judicial ;46 in fact he goes out of office when his
party goes out of power, like the rest of the Cabinet. An ap-
pointment or order made by -him has, therefore, the double as-
pect of being an act of the executive (for which he is directly ac-
countable to the electorate) ,'4 and 'yet an exercise of judicial dis-
cretion. 48  Certain of his official acts ar subject to a Parliamen-
tary veto."-
So much for the organization -and machinery of-the court
itself. Fror" this brief account, it is apparent that the Supreme
Court of Judicature over England and Wales is a sort of a port-
able house, the parts of which may be interchanged and shifted
about at will, to accommodate the ci-owds that frequent it. But
even more versatile is the procedure which has grown up under
the Acts. Containing within itself all the elements of develop-
has "taken silk" (the robe of a King's Counsel is supposed to be niade of
silk, while a junior's is merely "stuff"). The judges are usually chosen from
the busiest of the silks. The Lord Chancellor is generally chosen by the
Prime Minister from among the higher judiciary or the law officers of the
Crown. He, in turn, has the appointing of the other judges, who serve
"during good behavior."
" E. S. Roscoe: The Growth of English Law (London; 1912), p. 189:
"In England changes proceed so gradually that one is apt to overlook the
effect of a slow transition; it is clear, however, that the office of Lord Chan-
cellor is now less judicial and more administrative in its nature than it was
at the beginning of the reign of Victoria. The holder now fulfills more
political and fewer judicial duties."
" Lord Westbury was forced to resign the Great Seal in z865, as a conse-
quence of censure in the House of Commons, of his laxity in the making of
certain minor appointments. His downfall was, however, partly due to his
personal unpopularity.
a If the Chief Justice of Pernsylvania were appointed by the incoming
Governor, to hold office while the party had a majority, with the right to
appoint all the State judges, and, upon retirement, became a paid life .member
of the State Senate, he would occupy approximately the position of the
English Lord Chancellor. This merely by way of illustration.
'§25 of the Judicature Act, 1875, provides that any Order in Council
made under the Acts must be submitted to Parliament within forty days,
and may be annulled by that body. So also, as to Rls of Court, for
which, however, see inf/m.
STUDIES IN ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE
ment and improvement, it alters almost automatically with the
demands of changing years. This spirit of accommodation and
change is the most striking feature of the manner in which the
rule-making power has been used.
III.
The authority to make rules of procedure is now vested in
a committee of twelve persons, who include the Lord Chancellor,
the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the President
of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, four other
judges of the Supreme Court, two barristers and two solicitors
(the four last named being representatives of the Bar and of the
Law Councils respectively.5 0 In its discretion lies the making or
amending of all rules affecting the sittings of tht -.ourt, the du-
ties of its officers, pleading, practice, procedure and costs of pro-
ceedings therein."' Within the scope of its authority, rules can
be made, amended, or repealed as frequently as it considers nec-
essary, and the power has been freely used.
The Judicature Act, 1875 (§7), left it in the hands of a sort of general
council of the Bench. But this was found rather vague, so the following
year, in the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (§i7), a definite Rule Commit-
tee of six judges was constituted. Five years later (§ig of the Judicature
Act, 188x, 44 & 45 Vict., c. 88) the size was increased to eight members, in-
cluding the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the
Rolls, the President of the Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division, and four
judges of the High Court named by the Lord Chancellor. In x894 it was
thought advisable to add to the Rule Committee a few active practitioners,
which was provided by §4 of the Judicature Act, 1894. That Act made the
President of the Incorporated Law Society (the association of the London
solicitors), for the time being, a member of the Committee, and empowered
the Lord Chancellor to appoint two additional members, of whom at least
one must be a barrister in practice. This was not entirely a sucess, as the
Law Society changes its President annually, so that the one solicitor on the
Committee hardly had a chance to take part in its work. The defect was
repaired by the Rule Committee Act, i9o9 (9 Edw. VII, c. xi), which enacted
that the General Council of the Bar (as representing the barristers) should
choose two of their number to sit in the Rule Committee, that the Council
of the Incorporated Law Society (representing the London solicitors) should
have one member on the Committee, and that the Lord Chancellor should
appoint a fourth practitioner, who must be a member of a provisional Law
Society (therefore, a solicitor). Under these provisions, there are at the
present time in the Rule Committee a King's Counsel and a junior, to speak
for the barristers, a London solicitor and a Liverpool solicitor to represent
the solicitors. They all take an active interest in the Committee's work. The
four judges appointed by the Lord Chancellor include one member of the
Court of Appeal, one member of the Chancery Division, and two from the
King's Bench, although such an arrangement is optional with him.
3 These are the general terms used in §17 of the Judicature Act, x87.
More specific provisions of the Acts, as to the scope of the Committees
166 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The statutes make no stipulation as to the times for its
meetings or of the routine it should observe in its deliberations.
Its organization is therefore very simple. Its only officer is its
secretary, who is also the Lord Chancellor's, a permanent
official in the civil service. Meetings of the full committee take
place two or three times a year, at the call of the Lord Chancel-
lor, and may take place in his room at the House of Lords, or in
the rooms of the Lord Chief Justice or the Master of the Rolls
at the Royal Courts in the Strand. Such meetings are, as a rule,
for the purpose of taking definite action on some change which
has been proposed. It must not be supposed, however, that
these are the only occasions on which there is any consideration
of new rules. It is a characteristic of the English judges that
they are shy of formal meetings wheri friendly discussion can
accomplish the same ends, and before the actual meeting takes
place, the member proposing .the change will probably have
talked it over with two or three of his colleagues and settled
fairly definitely the wording of the proposal. Sometimes the full
committee will depute to a sub-committee the task of considering
the advisability of a proposed change, or of settling the form of
a new rule, but this has been done only rarely. Suggestions come
to the committee in a variety of ways. The persons who come to
it most frequently with new ideas are the masters of the Su-
preme Court, who come into personal contact with all the solici-
tors and counsel engaged in active litigation. They are the of-
ficers most intimate with the operation of the court's practice,
as it is their duty to stand guard over the steps taken in each ac-
authority, will be cited infra. The right of the Committee to make rules for
pocedure in the Supreme Court is exclusive, with these exceptions: (1)
nder §15 of the Judicature Act, x875, the enactments in respect to appeals
from County Courts may, by Order in Council, be made to apply to appeals
from other inferior courts of record. This covers the old Borough Courts,
many of which still survive. (2) Under §18 of the same Act, the general
Rules of the Supreme Court do not apply to divorce proceedings; they are
regulated by the President of the Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division,
under the powers conferred on him by §53 of the Matrimonial Causes Act,
1857 (20 & 21 Vict., c. 85). (3) Certain statutes confer the power to make
rules for their legal enforcement upon the Lord Chancellor in concurrence
with other named officialsi or bodies in the public service; such are the court
funds Acts, for which see note 3o, supra, the Solicitors Remuneration Act.
188i (44 & 45 Vict., c. 44), etc.
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tion and see that the game is fairly played. It has recently been
suggested that there should be a master on the Rule Committee.
What happens in such a case is that the masters have talked the
matter over in one of the monthly meetings they hold, and
threshed it out carefully. If the suggestion survives that ordeal,
the master who made it will frame a tentative draft of a new
rule embodying it and will make a personal call on one of the
judges with it. All the judges and masters are in the same build-
ing, so this is not a difficult business; the Master of the Rolls
seems to be the judge who is usually approached by the masters,
but that is a purely personal matter. If the judge considers the
suggestion a useful one, he will probably obtain the opinion of
one or two of the other judges upon it, and then reserve it for
the next meeting of the committee. Or, if it is a subject of im-
mediate importance he will communicate it to the Lord Chancel-
lor, who will then call a meeting of the full committee for the
earliest convenient date. Not infrequently, suggestions come
from the great body of the practitioners themselves. A number
of solicitors may have encountered the same difficulty in respect
to some point of practice. They have the subject brought up at
a meeting of the Council of the Law Society; if some definite
possibility of remedy emerges from the discussion, the Council
will instruct its member to submit it to the whole committee in
the shape of a new rule or an amendment. So also the General
Council of the Bar, acting for the other branch of the profession,
can speak through the two barristers it has on the committee. The
Bar Council is not as active, in this connection, as that of the so-
licitors, probably because the details of procedure do not trouble
the barrister so much as they do his professional client; it is the
solicitor who must placate the irate layman when rules stand- in
his way. On occasion, other legal bodies or officers, such as pro.
vincial Law Societies, or the Public Trustee, may make recom-
mendations based on personal experience. The Lord Chancel-
lor's Permanent Secretary is the channel through which the gen-
eral public are invited to send complaints and suggestions. In
every case, the final decision as to whether or not action is neces-
sary rests entirely with the committee, which is not hampered in
168 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
its consideration of the facts by statutory regulations of any
kind.
When the conclusion is reached that a change of any kind is
needed, the committee is, however, obliged to publish due notice
of it in the Gazette. ' ' It usually publishes the full text of the
draft rules, of which printed copies may be obtained of the of-
ficial printer at a fixed price per folio, by any public body 53 The
legal journals invariably publish such drafts also, with comment
upon them. Interested parties then have forty days within which
to send to the committee criticisms of the draft rules, or fresh
suggestions. These must be considered by the committee, and
forty days after the first publication it may issue the new rule or
rules, either in their original form or as altered, 4 and the rules
are then considered "made." They go into effect either at once,
or at a specific future time stated in the committee's resolution,"
and are then as binding upon the- profession and upon parties as
though they were part of an Act of Parliament. Parliament has
reserved to itself a right of veto upon such rules. Within forty
days after they are "made," the new rules must be laid by the
committee before both Houses of Parliament. 5 "  If, thereupon,
within the next forty days, either House passes an address to the
Crown requesting that the rules or any of-them be annulled, the
Privy Council may make an order in Council. annulling them,5 7
U §i (i) of the Rules Publication Act, 1893 (56,& 57 Vict., c. 66).
§1 (2) of the Rules Publication Act, 1893.
"Alterations in the original draft are, of course, entirely discretionary
with the Committee. It takes advantage of this preliminary publication to
hear expressions of opinion, and not infrequently does change its original
draft. The new Poor Persons Rules (which regulate actions brought in
forint pauperis) have been altered and postponed several times as a result
of adverse criticism upon their first publication.
"As allowed by §x (2) of the Act of i893. The usual custom is to pass
the Rules near the end of one "sittings," to come into operation at the begin-
ning of the next. The year is divided by Rule of Court (Order LXIII,
Rule i) into four Sittings and a Long Vacation, as follows:
Hilary Sittings: January iz to the Wednesday before Easter.
Easter Sittings: Tuesday after Easter Week to the Friday before Whit
Sunday.
Trinity Sittings: Tuesday after Whitsun Week to July 31.
Long Vacation: August I to October ri.
Michaelmas Sittings: October 12 to December 21.
" §25 of the Judicature Act, 1875.
" It is eloquent of the care with which the Committee does its wo;k, that
there seems to be no instance in which Parliament has exerted this right.
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without prejudice to proceedings that have, meanwhile, been
taken under them. Otherwise they stand as made.
With the admirable foresight of the Judicature Acts, there
is a further provision that in any case of urgency, the committee
may make rules to take effect at once, without the requirement of
forty days' prior publication. These, however, must be merely
provisional rules, to stand only until the committee is able to pro-
mulgate final riles through the regular channels.5
IV.
Although its powers are wide, the scope of the committee's
authority is fairly well defined and delimited by the Judicature
Acts. There are certain bounds beyond which it may not go, and
certain roads which it is obliged to follow. But the territory
assigned to it is a large one, and it should be of interest to Amer-
ican lawyers to note how much less hampered it is by statute
than are the somewhat similar informal committees of judges
who, in America, exercise what discretionary power there is in
the Bench to make its rules.
In two very broad sections are contained the bulk of the
committee's duties. The first is;
"The jurisdiction [of the Supreme Court] shall be exer-
cised (so far as regards procedure and practice) in the manner
provided by this Act, or by such Rules and Orders of Court as
may be made pursuant to this Act,"5'
and the second reads:
"Rules of Court may be made for regulating the pleading,
practice and procedure in the [Supreme] Court, and, generally,
for regulating any matters relating to the practice and proced-
ure therein." 00
These are flanked on either side by an array of provisions
which expressly enumerate some of these general powers. First
are the sections relating to certain statutes; the old court rules
"§2 of the Rules Publication Act, 1893. This power has been exercised
some half dozen times.
'§23 of the Judicature Act, 1873.
From §x7 (2) and (3) of the Judicature Act, z875.
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under which a number of statutes were administered are made
subjcct to alteration by the committee;"' any rules of proceedure
actually laid down in statutes passed prior to 1875 are subject to
be modified by the committee, so as to fit in with the new rules ;02
the committee may make new rules for the proper carrying out of
any statutes passed after 1875 which impose new duties upon the
courts;"' and there is a saving clause that all old procedure not
affected by the new rules is to remain in force." Then follow
two sections relating to inferior courts; the committee may regu-
late procedure on appeals from inferior courts to the High
Court ;0 and its concurrence must be obtained to any rules made
for the practice and procedure in inferior courts."6 The very
§5 of the Judicature Act, i894 (57 & 58 Vict., c. 16). A schedule to
the Act applies this power specifically to the Vexatious Suits Act, 1697, the
Transfer of Stock Act, i8oo, the Courts Funds Act, 18--9, the Civil Procedure
Act, 1833, the Judgments Acts, 1838 and 1840, the Court of Chancery Act,
184i, the Common Law Procedure Acts, 1852 and i86o, the Lis Pendens Act,
1867, and the Partition Act, i868.
' §24 of the Judicature Act, 1875. Rules made under the Juries Act, i87o,
appear in Statutory Rules and Orders, 1903, vol. 12, p. 674.
"§22 of the Judicature Act, 1879. Such power is expressly included in
the Settled Estates Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Vict., c. i8, s. 42) ; the Bills of Sale
Acts. 1878 and 1882 (41 & 42 Vict., c. 31, s. 21, and 45 & 46 Vict., c. 43) ; the
Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict&, c. 26,
s. 39); the Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act, i88i (44 & 45
Vict., c. 59, s. 6) ; the Settled Land Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict, c. 38, s. 46) ;
the Conveyancing Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict., c. 39, s. 2, 5) ; the Guardianship
of Infants Act, i886 (49 & 5o Vict., c. 27, s. I); the Local Government
Acts, i888 and i894 (5i & 52 Vict., c. 41, S. 29 and s. 89; 56 & 57 Viet., C. 73,
s. 70); the Statute Law Revision Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict., c. 57, s. 1, 2);
the Charitable Trusts (Recovery) Act, i8gi (54 & 55 Vict., c. 17, s. 6); the
Mail Ships Acts, i8gi and 19o2 (54 & 55 Vict., c. 31, S. 3, 8; 2 Edw. VII,
c. 36) ; the Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict., c. 30, s. Io) ; the Merchant Ship-
ping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict., c. 6o) ; the West Riding of Yorkshire Rivers
Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict., c. 166, s. 14, 4); the Life Assurance Companies
(Payment into Court) Act, 1896 (59 & 6o Vict., c. 8, s. 3); the Judicial
Trustees Act, 1896 (59 & 6o Vict., c. 35, s. 4); the Special Jdries Act, 1898
(6i & 62 Vict., c. 6, s. 1, 2); the London Government Act, 1899 (62 & 63
Vict., c. 14, s. 29) ; the Open Spaces Act, i9o6 (6 Edw. VII, c. 25, s. 4, 3) ;
the Merchant Shipping Act, i9o6 (6 Edw. VII, c. 48, s. 68); and the Finance
(i9o9-19io) Act, 19io (io Edw. VII, c. 8, s. 33, 4). The Rules made under
these Acts are either incorporated into the main body of the Rules of 1883
(which are now in force, as amended from time to time,) or published as
separate appendices. The full list i given to illustrate how frequently the
Rule Committee is called on in this way. In the case of technical statutes,
it is usually assisted by the appropriate government department.
" §21 of the Judicature Act, 1875.
§23 of the Judicature Act, 1884.
"§24 of the Judicature Act, 1884. Rules for the County Courts are pre-
pared, in the first instance, by a committee of five judges. under the County
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important matter of practice on appeals from the High Court
to the Court of Appeals is completely in the committee's con-
trol, 7 as is the equally important one of costs,"8 although in re-
spect to costs there is a further stipulation that they shall, subject
to the rules, be entirely in the discretion of the trial judge, who
"shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent
such costs are to be paid."" ' The power to make rules includes
the useful one of prescribing forms,, and many needless explana-
tions are saved by the setting out of numerous forms in appen-
dices to the rules.7 0 ' The Rule Committee is then empowered to
settle the details about the vacations and sittings,71 the distribu-
tion of work among the divisions and judges,7 2 and the character
of the proceedings to be taken in District Registries.73 Finally,
the general powers conclude with some suggestions as to meth-
ods by which to facilitate the trial of issues of fact; the rules
Courts Act, i888 (si & 52 Vict., c. 43) ; Rules for the other inferior courts
of record (the Borough and Hundred Courts) are prepared by the judge of
each court.
§ig of the Judicature Act, 1873: "Appeals may be taken . . . sub-
ject to such Rules and Orders of Court for regulating the terms and condi-
tions . . . as may be made."
"§17 (3) of the Judicature Act, 1875.
" §5 of the Judicature Act, x8go. Costs, in England, differ from costs as
usually understood in Pennsylvania in two particulars. First, they include
the charges of solicitor and counsel; second, they are itemized to show the
charge made for every separate act done, pleading drawn or paper copied.
It is therefore a material penalty if a party is obliged to pay the costs of
any particular step in the action in which he has been remiss. Even though
a winning party may obtain the general costs of the action from his defeated
opponent, he may himself be ordered by the judge to pay any costs which
have been unnecessarily incurred-for instance, by forcing his opponent to
call witnesses to prove a fact which might just as well have been admitted on
the record. Solicitors are sometimes ordered to pay costs out of their own
pockets, if it appears they incurred them in bad faith, simply to increase
the bill.
"§oo of the Judicature Act, 1873. The forms given include writs of
summons, entries of appearance, indorsements on writs, notices, affidavits,
interrogatories, admissions, statements of claim, defences, counterclaims,
replies, judgments, praecipes and writs for executions, subpoenas, summonses
and ordeis for.interlocutory applications, bonds, accounts, and general forms
for various aspects of chancery and probate business and taxation of costs.
"§§26 and 27 of the Judicature Act, 1873.
§§33 and 36 of the Judicature Act, 1873.
7§§64, 65 and 66 of the Judicature Act, 1873. They may also prescribe
what records and documents should be kept in District Registries. See note
28, supra.
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may provide for official or special references, 74 or for arbitra-
tions," and prescribe the procedure to be followed before such
referees and arbitrators;781 they may confer upon a Master the
powers of a judge under the Arbitration Act; 7" ano they may al-
low courts to call in assessors with whose assistance difficult is-
sues of fact may be tried.
7 8
These general powers were, to a slight extent only, cut down
by certain specific provisions in the Acts, which were necessary
principally to define the new double jurisdiction, legal and equit-
able, and because of the creation of such altogether new judicial
bodies as the Court of Appeal and the Divisional Courts. Full
recognition of all rights and liabilities and granting of all reme-
dies, both legal and equitable, are dictated in the keystone sec-
tion of the Act of I873, 7 and the following section of the Act
makes the equity procedure supersede that of the common law in
certain actions where they had conflicted.A0 As to the Court of
Appeal, it is laid down that interlocutory orders may be made by
a single judge,8 ' that motions for new High Court trials must
be made in that court and heard by three judges, 82 and what
matters are appealable, with and without leave.8 3 Then it is en-
acted that appeals to the High Court from inferior courts should
t4 §13 of the Arbitration Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict., C. 49); §57 of the
Judicature Act of 1873. See notes 33 and 36, supra.
"§14 of the Arbitration Act, 1889.
"§15 of the Arbitration Act, 1889.
' §2r of the Arbitration Act, i889.
"§56 of the Judicature Act, 1873. This is done in most Admiralty cases,
which are heard by a judge and two retired sea-captains-a picturesquo
tribunal.
: §24 of the Judicature Act, 1873.
"§25 of the Judicature Act, 1873. Subsection 8 allows the court to issue
a mandamus, grant an injunction or appoint a receiver, by an interlocutory
order, in any case where it appears "just or convenient."
" §52 of the Judicature Act, 1873.
"§i of the Judicature Act, 189o. But by consent of the parties, they
may, under §i of the Judicature Act, 189, be heard by the judges.
"No order made by consent, or as to costs (§49 of the Judicature Act,
1873) and no interlocutory order (§i of the Judicature Act, x894) may be
appealed from without leave (except in certain cases enumerated in the see-
tion). All practice points go to the Court of Appeal, which may give leave
to appeal from an interlocutory o-der even after the judge below has refused
it. The practice on application for leave to appeal is defined in an Order
of Court.
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be heard by Divisional Courts,84 that Divisional Courts may not
be appealed from without their leave,88 and that points of law
may be reserved by High Court judges for argument before or
consideration by a Divisional Court.s6 These matters are partly
jurisdictional, but are mentioned here because of their bearing
on procedure.
More specific restraint is put on the Rule Committee by
three prohibitions and a few definite rules embodied in the
statutes. The former are: First, that the old "common injunc-
tion" may no longer stay a proceeding in any division of the
court ;87 second, that the rules do not apply to divorce proceed-
ings ;"' and last, but most important, that the rules may not alter
the established rules of evidence in jury trials, or do away with
oral examination of witnesses, or completely abolish the jury.,,
Scattered here and there through the Acts will be found the fol-
lowing specific rules, which were, for various reasons, fixed be-
yond the Rule Committee's reach: A plaintiff may assign his ac-
tion to any division he thinks proper, and all interlocutory steps
must be taken in that division ;90 every matter commenced in the
Chancery Division must be assigned to a particular judge;61 all
"§i of the Judicature Act, 1894.
§45 of the Judicature Act, 1873.
" §46 of the Judicature Act, 1873. But this is subject to the right of
every party in a jury trial, under §22 of the judicature Act, 1875, to have
rulings on the evidence admissible, and a direction to the jury based thereon,
so that exceptions may be taken on the ground of an improper charge. It
should be added that a motion for a new trial based on such exceptions is
treated with suspicion, unless they affect the substantial merits of the case.
"§24 (5) of the Judicature Act, 1873, does away with this veteran
scandal of the law courts, by allowing equitable matters which formerly
would have been ground for the injunction to be pleaded in defence. A
party may still, however, move for a stay on proper grounds.
U Under §i8 of the Judicature Act, 1875, the President of the Probate
and Divorce Admiralty Division retains the power to make rules for divorce
proceedings, conferred by the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857.
"§20 of the Judicature Act, z875. But an exception to this was made
by §3 of the Judicature Act, 1894, which allowed the means and mode of
proving facts to be regulated by Rules of Court (i) in any proceeding for
the distribution of property, and (2) in any interlocutory application in a
pending cause.
"§,i of the Judicature Act, 1875. But this is to be read together with
§34 of the Judicature Act, z873; see notes i9 and 20, supra.
"§42 of the Judicature Act, 1873. The plaintiff marks his writ (or other
paper commencing proceedings) "Chancery Division," or "King's Bench
Division," which is the assignment to a Division. If it is Chancery, the
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trials shall be, as far as possible, before a single judge, and all
applications between trial and final judgment must be made to
him ;92 a judge may hear causes for any other judge in his own
division without the necessity of a formal transfer ;9 .and provi-
sion must be made for the hearing of all such applicaions as re-
quire to be promptly heard in London during vacation.9 4
To these must be added the one section which contains prac-
tically all the authors of the Judi6ature Acts thought necessary
to insert in the statutes on the burning question of pleading,"
the same section that blew up the last dike that stood between the
waters of equity and of law. Its command to every judge of
the court to take cogniizance of all rights and liabilities, both legal
and equitable, and to terminate the whole controversy between
the parties in one action is the inspiration of the new pleading
which has been created by the rules. The greatest liberality as
to joinder of parties and of causes of action, as to amendment,
counterclaim,96 discovery, execiution and a dozen other matters
has been displayed in the exercise of the duty here imposed.
This completes the list. As has been stated, the restraints
on the Rule Committee's powers are few. The Judicature Acts
,are in no sense a code of practice, and only in a general way a
writ clerk who stamps the writ assigns the matter to one of the six judges,
according to a rota. That judge then.has personal charge (through his own
set of clerks) of all matters connected with that proceeding. The plaintiff
cannot make his choice of a judge, as he can of a Division.
.§17 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876.
" §6 of the Judicature Act, x884.
"§28 of the Judicature Act, 1873. Two judges are always designated to
hear such applications.
" §24 of the Judicature Act, 1873.
" Subsection 3 of §24 is specific on the subject of counterclaim. It reads:
" . . .Every judge . .. . shall have power to grant to any defendant
all such relief against any plaintiff or petitioner as . . . said judge might
have granted in any suit instituted for that purpose by the same defendant
against the same plaintiff or petitioner." The subsection goes on, to bring
into existence an entirely new weapon for the pleader-the "third party
procedure," which enables a defendant to obtain "all such relief . . . con-
nected with the original subject of the cause . . . claimed against any
other person, whether already a party to the same cause or not, . . . as
might properly have been granted against such person if he had been made
defendant to a cause duly instituted by the defendant for the like purpose."
The Rules drawn under this last power limit the right to cases where "a
defendant claims to be entitled to contribution or indemnity over against
any person not a party to the action," but the device is frequently made
use of.
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code of court organization. But they contain general principles
within which it is possible to exercise the widest discretion. Not
to leave that discretion entirely at sea, the Act of 1875 carried
with it, in a schedule, a model set of rules,97 which were recom-
mended for adoption, but were made wholly subject to altera-
tion and amendment at the committee's will. A brief inspection
of these rules (though they have been greatly altered since) will
convey in a concrete way how very large a power was entrusted
to the committee's expert hands.
V.
Every biographer prefaces his narrative with some account
of his hero's parentage and antecedents, to satisfy the reader's
human interest in gossip of the family connection and give to
scientists material with which they can prove that either heredity
or environment is the common denominator of all human affairs.
No such justification can be pleaded for the following para-.
graphs, but the Rules of 1875 have a history of their own which,
though it throws but little light upon that "intent of the legisla-
ture" which alone has legal value in the interpretation of statutes,
yet cannot fail to be of interest to those students of legal reform
who know how greatly its progress is influenced by the exigencies
of practical politics. Especially in England, where the directing
power of the Cabinet is so complete over Parliament, is the per-
sonnel of the Ministry a matter of moment to the shape which
legislation will assume. In this case the interest lies in discover-
ing why the new rules of procedure appear in the particular form
of a schedule to an Act of Parliament.
In point of time, the period of the Judicature Acts corre-
sponds to that of the rivalry of those two momentous figures in
" The schedule to Lord Selborne's Act of 1873, contained 58 Rules
intended to serve the same purpose, and in the summer of 1874 the judges
issued a complete set of Rules based on that schedule. But Lord Cairn's
Act postponed the operation of the former Act from November , 1874, t'o
November r, 1875. The schedule of Rules in the new Act of 1875, was a
consolidation of the original schedule of 1873 and the subsequent Rules of
r874, with some changes and additions. As the former rules were repealed
before they went into effect, it will be sufficient to examine them in the
form in which they appear in the schedule of 1875 (L. R, Statutes, 1875,
p. 778 et seq.).
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Victorian history, Gladstone and Disraeli. Their successive vic-
tories and defeats mark milestones along the road of judicature
reform, though both leaders favored the principle in a general
way. Without describing the agitation for law reform that char-
acterized the sixties, it is sufficient to remark that the division of
the field of remedies between equity and the common law was the
irritant that urged it on, and that, like most popular movements
affecting the law, it began many years before it reached its great-
est intensity and was" not appeased by the fact that substantially
all it asked for had already been accomplished by the Common
Law Procedure Acts and the Chancery Practice Amendment
Acts of the preceding decade. It was, however, strong enough to
be one of the political problems which L6rd Derby's Conserva-
tive Cabinet of 1866 felt itself called upon to solve. The task
was set about in the typically English -way: before making any
proposals a Royal Commission was appointed to report on the
situation and outline recommendations for any necessary.
changes.9 s At the head of that conimission Lord Derby put his
former Attorney-General, Hugh McCalmont, Lord Cairns, rec-
ognized as easily the first lawyer of his time, to whom more than
to any other man the ultimate success of the whole movement
"The Commission was created on September 18, 867, with thirteen
members;-two more were added on October =, 1867, and two more on
January 25, 1869 (when the Liberals came in). Included among its seven-
teen members were three who were destined to become Lord Chancellors:
Lord Cairns, then a Lord -of Appeal of a year's standing, became Lord
Chancellor when Lord Derby resigned and Disraeli took office in March,
1868, and again when Disraeli formed his second Cabinet in 1874; Sir William
Page Wood, then a Vice-Chancellor, became Lord Chancellor Hatherley upon
Gladstone's Liberal victory in December, 1868; and upon Lord Hatherley's
resignation in October, 1872, Sir Roundell Palmer accepted the Great Seal
and the peerage he had previously refused, to become Lord Chancellor Sel-
borne. Another member of the Commission (added in x869) was the Liberal
Solicitor-General Sir John Duke Coleridge, who later became Chief Justice
of the Common Pleas, and, upon the death of Sir Alexander Cockburn in
i88o, Lord Chief Justice of England. Two judges in the Commission who
later became Lords of Appeal were Baron Bramwell of the Exchequer, and
Mr. Justice Blackburn of the Queen's Bench, the author of Blackburn on
Sales. Two members were later elevated to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council-Sir Montague Smith, then a judge in the Common Pleas, and
Sir Ribert P. Collier (later Lord Monkswell), Gladstone's Attorney-General.
Two other valuable members were Sir John B. Karslake, Disraelis brilliant
.Attorney-General, and Sir R. J. Philhmore, the Judge of the Admiralty
Court,. a polished and scholarly master of the canon law. As these names
testify, the greatest legal minds of the day were gathered together for this
important investigation
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must be ascribed. In the eighteen months during which the
commission worked, its chairman became Lord Chancellor for
nine months,"s and then another of its members took his seat
upon the woolsack, but its deliberations continued unabated until
finally, in 1869, it presented its first report, 9  the report on which
all the great reforms of the next few years were built. In less
than twenty pages the report reviews the defects in the adminis-
tration of the superior courts of England and sets forth a prac-
tical plan for a general consolidation and unification of jurisdic-
tion and pro,:edure. Such brevity, clearness and constructive
genius are all too rare in the dreary wilderness of government
publications.100
The section of t e report devoted to procedure covers not
five pages, but it reviews the entire progress of a litigation from
beginning to end, naming specifically the weaknesses it objects
to, and proposing specifically the remedies it would apply. "We
can only give a sketch in this report, of the leading principles of
the system which we recommend," the section begins, "leaving
for General Orders, or for a Code of Procedure, as may appear
most advisable, the fuller development and completion of the
scheme proposed." Then, after enumerating the suggestions
evolved by the commissioners, it concludes: "Power should be
vested in the Supreme Court to regulate from time to time by
General Orders the procedure and practice in all its divisions,
and to make such changes in the duties of the several officers of
the court as may from time to time be thought fit, and may be
consistent with the nature of their appointments." These few
"a Lord Cairns shared Disraeli's brief first instalment of power, from
March to Decemler, x868. The defedt of the Conservatives opportunely set
him free to devote his undivided attention to the work of the Commission
"Published March 25, i869, as Parliamentary Paper No. 4130 (1868-
69, xxv. I). It dealt so!eiy with the constitution of the new court it recom-
mended and with the procedure which should be used in it. The other three
reports of the Judicature Commission, published from time to time ;n the
next few years, were the work principally of new members who were added
to the Commission; they cannot compare with the First Report in any respect
and have been of little practical value.
'"Its excellence was appreciated at once. THE LAW MAGAZINE AND
REv1iEv said of it (Old Series. vol. 27, p. 143, i869): "There has not, prob-
ably, for years been a Commission whose labours have proved so thoroughly
satisfactory to the public."
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words made it clear that the commissioners were convinced the
sections of a possible code of proce!dure should, at any rate, not
form part of the same statute which defined the constitution and
jurisdiction of the court itself. Further, the recommendation
as to power in the court to make alterations in its procedure from
time to time showed they thought the procedural code should not
have the rigid form of an Act of Parliament. But the question
of form was left open, and it turned out to be one of great im-
portance.
Lord Hatherley was the legal head of the Government to
whom the historic first report was made; he was also one of its
signers.10 1 Within a very few months he introduced in the
House of Lords a bill embodying the suggestions of the report
as to the consolidation of the superior courts. But his bill con-
tained only this slight reference to the important procedural
changes which the creation of the new court would require: It
proposed to bestow the power to make rules of procedure exclu-
sively on a committee of the Privy Council,1 0 2 and provided that
a set of rules should be drafted by that committee after the bill
should have passed into law. This left the whole problem of the
court's procedure up in the air. The provisions of the bill relat-
ing to the structure of the court itself was acceptable enough,
but without some indication of how the machine would work,
all discussion on its usefulness was perforce academic. The com-
mon law judges, just before the bill was to be brought up in the
Lords for its second reading, sent to the Lord Chancellor, on
May 13, 187o, a resolution which forcibly attacked this omission
in the bill, among others.103 They said: "While the judges are
agreed that subordinate rules of procedure and rules of practice
202 He had not, unfortunately, the ability of his predecessor Cairns, and
the fate of his Judicature Bill was partly due to his own limitations.
3 Lord Hatherley's first draft gave to the judges the power to make
Rules of Procedure, but he became convinced they would have no time
to devote to such a duty and changed the section to give it the effect above
described.
" The personal animosity between Chief Just*ce Cockburn, who signed
the Resolution on behalf of the judges, and Lord Hatherley, was undoubtedly
increased by the Lord Chancellot's proposal to put the rule-making power
into executive rather than judicial hands. Even from an unprejudiced view-
point such a provision seems weak.
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may be left to be settled hereafter, they are of opinion that, look-
ing to the great and substantial difference which exists between
the procedure of the equity and the common law courts, the more
important matters of procedure ought to be considered and de-
termined by Parliament, and should form part of the bill . ..
The judges submit that certain fixed guiding principles and rules
should, after due consideration, be embodied in the bill, instead
of being left to be decided upon hereafter." This protest was of
sufficient solidity to block the passage of the bill through Parlia-
ment, 0 4 and as Lord Hatherley failed to bring his measure into
more practical and acceptable shape, the Government of the day
withdrew its support and the Judicature bill fell by the way-
side.105
In October of 1872, Lord Hatherley's failing -eyesight
forced him to give up the onerous duties of his office, 0 6 and
Gladstone offered the Lord Chancellorship again to Sir Roundell
Palmer, who now saw his way clear to accepting107 and took the
title of Lord Selborne upon his entrance into the Upper House.
He at once set about drafting a new bill to bring into being the
'"In the House of Lords itself, Lord Cairns had attacked this feature
of the Bill consistently. His view, as paragraphed in $ LAw JoURNAL, 245
(May 6, 187o), was that "the Legislature ought to declare the leading prin-
ciples to be followed by the framers of the Rules, so that those persons may
be builders, and not arcliitects."
'"This was explained in 14 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 829 (August 13, 1870):
"What more than anything else prevented the passage of the Bill this year
was, it appears to us, the unwillingness of Parliament, at any rate of the
House of Lords, to delegate absolutely to anybody outside Parliament the
power of dealing with everything falling under the head of procedure and
practice. . . . The code of procedure ought, in outline at least, to be pre-
pared at once, not only because Parliament is hardly liely to pass the measure
at all until it is done, but also because it must be done some time before the
Act can come into operation." But several years passed before this advice
was followed.
I During 1871 and 1872 the only topics of law reforma discussed in Parlia-
ment were the constitution of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
as the final Imperial Court of Appeals, and the efforts of a few far-sighted
thinkers, headed by Lord Selborne, to establish in London an Imperial Col-
lege of Law which should unify and supplant the scattered agencies of legal
education in England and the Colonies. Little came of the first, and noth-
ing at all of the second.
' He had refused it when Gladstone first offered it in i868 as, being a
strong Churchman, he was opposed to the Premier's policy of Church dis-
establishment in Ireland. This spirit of independence prompted him to
reject the offer again in 1886 when Gladstone was forming his third Cabinet,
because he had not joined in the Prime Minister's conversion to Irish Home
Rule.
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great court recommended by the commission of which be, too,
had been a member. In a few months he was ready, and on Feb-
ruary 13, 1873, he introduced his measure in the Lords. Profit-
ing by the experience of Lord Hatherley, he "had inserted as a
schedule to the bill a series of fifty-eight short rules, covering the
changes recommended by the commissioners in their First Re-
port of 1869. However, it was manifestly impossible to define
the entire practice of a superior court of general jurisdiction in
such brief compass-, so the bill further provided for the drafting
of a complete set of detailed rules and forms after it should be-
come law, guided by the principles enunciated in the schedule.10'
This was, at any rate, an advance, as it gave the legislature some-
thing tangible to discuss. It proved sufficiently satisfactory to be
the basis of a compromise, and rather than postpone reform in-
definitely again, Parliament passed the bill with minor changes,
and it became law on August 5, 1873. It was not, however, to
go into effect for over a year, the intention being to give ample
time to draw up the complete rules and allow the profession to
become familiar with them before they were set into operation.
Accordingly, on November 25, Lord Selborne appointed a com-
mittee of three expert draftsmen to carry out in detail the princi-
ples of his schedule,1 09 and placed them under the supervision of
2" The comment of the SoLICTroRs' JOURNAL upon this was (17 Sol. J. 72T,
lulY 19, 1873): "No one is quite satisfied with the provisions of the Bill as
it stands. .... The Bill, which is in many points, especially in everything
that affects procedure, a mere skeleton, has to be clothed with flesh and
blood by means of Rules of Court and Forms of Proceedings. . . . To
whomsoever the duty of actually framing the Rules and Forms may be
entrusted, the task will be about as anxious and difficult a one as could well
be undertaken, and it will only be successfully carried out if the profession
generally give their assistance by free discussion and intelligent suggestion.,
The barristers' journal was no less appreciative of the importance of the
Rules (8 LAw JOURNAL, 129, March 1, 1874): "It may safely be averred that
if the Lord Chancellor's judicature Bill with the Schedule thereto be passed
into law, the rules of procedure embodied in that Schedule will effect a
greater revolution in the ordinary business of barristers, attorneys and
solicitors, than will be accomplished by the Bill itself."
'"The three he selected were H. Cadman Jones, who, with Josiah W.
Smith, Q. C., had drawn up the Consolidated General Orders of the Court
of Chancery of i86o; Arthur Wilson. the tutor of Common Law at the
Inner Temple, who later published the commentaries on the Acts and Rules
known as "Wilson's Judicature Acts," which took the place of "Day's Com-
mon Law Procedure Acts" and "Morgan's Orders in Chancery" as the prae-
tioner's guide, philosopher and friend; and Dr. Tristrami the noted authority
on practice in probate, admiralty and divorce courts of ecclesiastical lineage.
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a committee of judges, at whose head he put his Master of the
Rolls, the great Jessel. 110
But before these draftsmen had gone far in their labors, an-
other turn came in the political wheel, in February, 1874, when
the Conservatives came back into office and Disraeli once more
took the helm. Lord Selborne was displaced by Lord Cairns,
who had ideas about the new Supreme Court that had not found
place in his Liberal predecessor's arrngement. In July, 1874,
he had Parliament pass an Act postponing the operation of Lord
Selborne's Act for another year, so he might have time to work
out his plans. This they were not at all unwilling to do, as the
promised rules for the previous Act had been slow in making
their appearance. Not until June I, 1874, had the draftsmen
submitted their completed rules to the committee of judges, and
up to July the judges had not yet finished considering them.""
Only in the first week of August, 1874, was the final text of the
rules for the 1873 Act laid before Parliament. By that time the
operation of the Act had already been postponed to November,
1875, and Lord Cairns was busy on a new bill with which he in-
tended to modify certain portions of the work Lord Selborne
had done.
1 12
In February, 1875, the new bill was introduced, and by
August i i it had received the Royal Assent.113 Like the Act of
"The other judges on the committee were the Lord Chancellor (Lord
Selborne), the three Common Law Chiefs-Sir Alexand6r Cockburn, Sir
John Duke Coleridge and Sir Fitzroy Kelly, Lord Justice Mellish, Vice-
Chancellor Hall, Baron Bramwell, Mr. Justice Lush, Mr. Justice Brett, Sir
James Hinnen and Sir Robert Phillimore. Some of these were among the
signers to the Judicature Commission's First Report. But for the untimely
death of Mr. Justice Willes in October, 1872, who was then the best living
authority on practice and procedure, he would undoubtedly have been placed
in charge of the work.
.The Rules were prepared by the draftsmen in three separate batches,
and as each batch was completed it was laid before the judges, and copies
were circulated by them among such official and representative persons as
they thought desirable, and the whole subjected to the committees revision.
1" Not in any spirit of partisanship, for Cairns, like his predecessor, was
no party figurehead. Soon after he first accepted a peerage at the hands of
Lord Derby in 1867, he voted against his party in the Lords on an important
measure affecting an extension of the Parliamentary franchise. It was this
willingness to cobperate with his political opponent that led him to retain the
three draftsmen Lord Selborne had appointed, rather than break into their
collaboration after three months' of work together.
"'The principal changes it made in the Act of 1873 were with regard to
the final court of appeal. Lord Selborne's Act had made the Supreme Court
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1873, it carried with it a schedule of rules, but this time the
schedule was more than a skeleton. It was the full text of the
rules approved by the judges under the Schedule of 1873, into
which had been consolidated the schedule of 1873 itself and a
few changes rendered necessary by the text of the principal Act.
On November i practice in the new court began under the new




the highest court in England, cutting off the old right of appeal to.the House
of Lords. But this proved unsatisfactory on further inspection, as the Act
did not affect Ireland and Scotland, appeals from which could go. as before,
to the House of Lords-a right which the English would hardly deprive
themselves of with equanimity while reserving it to the other kingdoms in
the Union. Rather than set about remodelling the entire judicial systems of
these countries. Lord Cairns restored the right of appeal to the House of
Lords, in English cases.
